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Abstract 
 
This article proposes a typology of causal mechanisms whereby transnational relations of 
recognition constitute conflict actors in frozen conflicts. While the agency of an emerging 
conflict actor manifests itself in ‘struggles for recognition’ motivated by experiences of 
‘disrespect’, responses from different significant others vary in terms of motivations and 
pathways (mechanisms of recognition). Adapting Honneth’s tripartite division, the 
typology distinguishes between four forms of recognition; thin cognitive recognition, 
‘respect’/rights, ‘esteem’/difference and ‘love’/empathy. Three transnational corrections 
are made in order to include transnational relations of recognition, non-state actors and 
unstructured social-relational forms of international/transnational recognition. The 
typology is applied to the conflict of Western Sahara, which has been reshaped by the rise 
of internal Sahrawi pro-independence groups (based inside the territory annexed by 
Morocco) as an increasingly relevant conflict actor, with their identity shifting from 
victims to human rights activists to activists involved in an unsolved conflict. This 
identity and social-status formation has been the product of transnational recognition 
from three significant others, i.e. the annexing state (Morocco), the contested state-in-
exile (SADR) and the international community. The overall effect of intermingling 
recognition processes, including various instrumental initiatives deprived of mutuality, 
has been increased struggle and conflict complexity rather than ‘recognitional peace’. 
 
Key words 
 
Recognition theory, frozen conflicts, transnationalism, causal mechanisms, Western 
Sahara 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
This article has benefitted from feedback and suggestions, at various stages, from 
Michal Natorski, Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, my colleagues from the Centre of 
Advanced International Studies/Department of Politics at the University of Exeter, and 
the Review of International Studies’ anonymous reviewers and editors. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
‘Frozen conflict’ is often more of an enticing metaphor than a streamlined analytical 
concept. Frozen conflicts have been defined as conflict situations where ‘the violence 
stopped, but the underlying interests of the formerly warring parties have neither been 
abated nor addressed’.1 ‘Contested states’2 with limited international recognition but 
unwilling to relinquish their sovereignty aspirations are frequently part of the stalemate 
equation. Yet, the pressing of the pause button implied by the adjective ‘frozen’ raises 
eyebrows. If there is any consensus in the meagre scholarship on this topic, it is that frozen 
conflicts are seldom such. Smetana and Ludvík distinguish between three types of 
dynamics: peaceful thawing, violent thawing and conflict withering. Among the causes 
of these changes, they tentatively point to third party involvement, including that of the 
contested state’s ‘patron state’, the practices of the ‘international conflict resolution 
apparatus’ and the shifting interests of various domestic actors.3 The list is not meant to 
be exhaustive and leaves out significant yet understudied internal dynamics,4 including 
bottom-up alterations in the inner player/party structure of a frozen conflict that may be 
driven by the emergence of a new conflict actor. Such is the focus of this article, where I 
will argue that, in these dynamics, ‘what counts as a relevant actor, and how these actors 
acquire their status or standing’5 is essentially a product of recognition. 
 
                                                          
1 Valery Perry, ‘At Cross Purposes? Democratization and Peace Implementation Strategies in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s Frozen Conflict’, Human Rights Review, 10:1 (2009), p. 36. 
2 Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). 
3 Michal Smetana and Jan Ludvík, ‘Between War and Peace: A Dynamic Reconceptualization of “Frozen 
Conflicts”’, Asia Europe Journal, online first (2018), pp. 9-11. 
4 Magdalena Dembinska and Aurélie Campana, ‘Frozen Conflicts and Internal Dynamics of De Facto 
States: Perspectives and Directions for Research’, International Studies Review, 19:2 (2017), pp. 254-278. 
5 Jens Bartelson, ‘Three Concepts of Recognition’, International Theory, 5:1 (2013), p. 111. 
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Defined as the intersubjective relation required for the ‘formation of the practical self’6 
and, by extension, ‘a social act’ whereby ‘another actor […] is constituted as a subject 
with a legitimate social standing’,7 recognition presupposes a dynamic interaction 
between the agency, or ‘struggle’, of a given actor and responses from one or various 
‘significant others’. The former’s identity formation and social status inherently depend 
on the latter’s feedback. Then, how can the workings of recognition constitute actorness 
and thereby become a force for change within the context of a frozen conflict? What are 
the causal mechanisms involved on both sides of the developing self-other relationship(s) 
and how do they play out? 
 
The conflict over Western Sahara in northwest Africa pitting Morocco against the pro-
independence Polisario Front – plus its conjoined contested state-in-exile, the Sahrawi 
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) – is one of those stuck in the kind of protracted ‘no 
war, no peace’ situation described by the frozen conflict literature. Large-scale violence 
or open warfare has been absent for nearly three decades, and thus it no longer qualifies 
as a war or armed conflict in databases such as the UCDP/PRIO one or Correlates of War. 
However, no proper peace settlement has yet been reached, and ‘the basic incompatibility 
between the parties – the status of the territory of Western Sahara – remains unresolved’.8 
Western Sahara therefore helps us to envisage a universal, not-region-specific definition 
of frozen conflict, stripped of the post-Soviet bias with which the concept originally 
became associated in the 1990s. Furthermore, this is a particularly intriguing case for 
addressing the problem of change in frozen conflicts. Over the last two decades, while 
                                                          
6 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts (Cambridge: 
Polity, 1995), p. 68. 
7 Alexander Wendt, ‘Why a World State is Inevitable’, European Journal of International Relations, 9:4 
(2003), p. 511. 
8 See http://ucdp.uu.se/#/statebased/721. 
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failing to ‘transform’ in the resolution-oriented sense that the conflict literature usually 
attributes to such term, Western Sahara has undergone a gradual yet substantial ‘spatial 
and scalar shift’. Through a sort of ‘inward turn’,9 the conflict’s political centre of gravity 
and struggle has returned from an extraterritorial exile locus to the interior of the disputed 
land where it originated in the mid-1970s, mostly occupied and annexed since that time 
by Morocco. I have argued that such structural move has been driven by the emergence 
and constitution of a new (in this case non-state) conflict actor; namely, internal Sahrawi 
pro-independence groups based within the disputed territory. This, in turn, has 
necessitated cross-border, transnational recognition from three significant others – the 
Moroccan state, the Polisario Front/SADR and the international community.10 Without 
such recognition, internal Sahrawi nationalists would not count today as a relevant 
conflict actor. Yet, how have these struggles for recognition and responses to them 
specifically operated? And what has been their impact on the constitution of the new 
conflict actor? 
 
This article addresses the empirical puzzle of the emergence of a new non-state conflict 
actor in Western Sahara owing to, and by means of, transnational recognition dynamics. 
Based on this case study, it takes a step towards middle-range theorising by building a 
typology of the causal mechanisms whereby transnational relations of recognition 
constitute – i.e. shape the collective identity formation and social status of – conflict 
actors in frozen conflicts. With ‘its unique capacity to meaningfully engage with socio-
spatial relations at both local and global levels through which people construct their 
                                                          
9 Irene Fernández-Molina, ‘Towards a Multilevel Analysis of the Western Sahara Conflict and the Effects 
of its Protractedness’, in Raquel Ojeda-García, Irene Fernández-Molina and Victoria Veguilla (eds) 
Global, Regional and Local Dimensions of Western Sahara’s Protracted Decolonization: When a 
Conflict Gets Old (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017a), pp. 10-12. 
10 Irene Fernández-Molina, ‘Protests under Occupation: The Spring inside Western Sahara’, 
Mediterranean Politics, 20:2 (2015), pp. 235-254. 
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identity’,11 recognition theory provides a distinct angle for examining the transnational 
dimension of conflicts12 in primarily social terms, looking at the role of non-material 
factors whose causal operation cannot be reduced to rational choice. The explanatory lens 
of causal mechanisms places the attention on ‘the pathways or processes by which an 
effect is produced or a purpose is accomplished’.13 This has been advocated as an avenue 
for cumulative middle-range theoretical progress in International Relations (IR), typically 
in the form of causal mechanism typologies.14  
 
In this respect, the two-sided nature of recognition relations implies the operation of two 
causal mechanisms in parallel. On one hand, the agency of the emerging conflict actor 
manifests itself in a series of ‘struggles for recognition’. According to Honneth’s theory, 
the causal mechanism at work here is quite straightforward and universal. It is always the 
painful experience of denial of recognition or ‘disrespect’ that motivates a subject to 
engage in this sort of moral struggle, ‘for it is only by regaining the possibility of active 
conduct that individuals can dispel the state of emotional tension into which they are 
forced as a result of humiliation’.15 What is less homogeneous are the motivations and 
pathways for significant others to respond to the new actor’s struggle in one way or 
another. This is what the typology in this article seeks to capture as ‘mechanisms of 
recognition’. 
 
                                                          
11 Shannon Brincat, ‘Cosmopolitan Recognition: Three Vignettes’, International Theory, 9:1 (2017), p. 3. 
12 Jeffrey T. Checkel (ed.), Transnational Dynamics of Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2013). 
13 John Gerring, ‘The Mechanismic Worldview: Thinking inside the Box’, British Journal of 
Political Science, 38:1 (2008), p. 178, plural added. 
14 Andrew Bennett, ‘The Mother of All Isms: Causal Mechanisms and Structured Pluralism in 
International Relations Theory’, European Journal of International Relations, 19:3 (2013), pp. 459-481. 
15 Honneth (1995) p. 138. 
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The remainder of the article proceeds in four steps. First, a review is made of the journey 
of recognition theory from Hegelian philosophy through critical theory to IR and 
peacebuilding, identifying also the biases and blind spots of each of these strands. Second, 
building on Honneth’s tripartite division of forms of recognition (‘love’, ‘respect’, 
‘esteem’),16 the theoretical foundations are laid for a typology of causal mechanisms of 
transnational recognition involved in the constitution of conflict actors in frozen conflicts. 
This requires examining the challenges of empirically operationalising and adapting 
Honneth’s ‘social theory with normative content’, as well as making three transnational 
corrections with the aim of including transnational relations of recognition, recognition 
struggles of non-state actors, and unstructured social and relational forms of 
international/transnational recognition. Third, the effects of frozen conflict on 
transnational recognition dynamics are considered with specific reference to the case of 
Western Sahara. Finally, inductive insights from this case study are incorporated in order 
to substantiate the typology of mechanisms of recognition, which combines the two 
dimensions along which responses to the internal Sahrawi nationalists’ struggles may 
vary, i.e. significant others and forms of recognition. 
 
2. The journey of recognition from philosophy to IR and peacebuilding 
 
‘Everyone cares about recognition’.17 Recognition theory as we know it today emerged 
in the 1990s in an attempt to underscore how pervasive and constitutive relations of 
recognition are throughout social and political life. The shared philosophical ancestor for 
all of its proponents was Hegel, the author of the concept of the ‘struggle for recognition’. 
This was developed in his Phenomenology of Spirit’s famous master-servant dialectic – 
                                                          
16 Ibid. pp. 92-130. 
17 Cillian McBride, Recognition (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), p. 1. 
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where two self-consciousnesses engage in a struggle to be recognised as such by one 
another, illustrating how freedom is necessarily realised in social interactions, or 
intersubjectively mediated18 – as well as in earlier writings preceding his metaphysical 
turn. Honneth was actually much keener on the latter for their emphasis on the ‘original 
intersubjectivity of human life’ and the ‘interpenetration of socialisation and 
individuation’ on all levels – psychological, sociological, legal, political – and not just 
for the formation of self-consciousness.19 All in all, Hegel’s core idea that the constitution 
of a subject’s self-identity depends on the encounter with, and acknowledgement by, other 
autonomous subjects would stay as a powerful challenger of the atomistic assumptions 
about the individual-society relationship that characterise mainstream modern social 
philosophy.20 
 
The Hegelian relational ontology was brought back to the forefront in social theory and 
the social sciences in the early 1990s by two parallel currents of what would become 
known as recognition theory.21 On one hand, a continental philosophical approach rooted 
in the Frankfurt School critical theory tradition, represented by Honneth,22 put forward a 
comprehensive ‘social theory with normative content’ based on the premise that there is 
one underlying ‘moral grammar’ that is common to all social struggles. According to 
Honneth, the three components of any individual’s self-determination are self-
confidence, self-respect and self-esteem, which in turn rely on the social recognition 
provided by others in the form of ‘love’, ‘rights’ and ‘solidarity’, respectively. The 
                                                          
18 See Michael Theunissen, ‘The Repressed Intersubjectivity in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’, in Drucilla 
Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds) Hegel and Legal Theory (Oxon/New York: 
Routledge, 1991), pp. 3-63. 
19 Honneth (1995) pp. 29, 16, 62-63. 
20 Ibid. pp. 3-30. 
21 McBride (2013) pp. 2-3. 
22 Honneth (1995). 
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disrespect experienced when any of these is denied triggers struggles for recognition 
which act as a ‘productive force for change’.23 On the other hand, an Anglo-American 
strand led by Taylor24 developed the notion of the ‘politics of recognition’ in relation to 
multiculturalism and the politics of identity, as a critique of universalistic rights-based 
approaches to these issues. This latter strand became a lively breeding ground for 
scholarship on the struggles of all kinds of subaltern social groups and minorities 
suffering from misrecognition, the so-called ‘new social movements’ and the ‘politics of 
difference’. 
 
The critical theory and ‘politics of recognition’ approaches share a number of common 
traits. First, in terms of level of analysis, they both extrapolate the Hegelian mechanisms 
of recognition from the (inter)personal psychological domain by assigning collective 
agency – the capability to be subject and object of recognition – to larger social groups. 
Honneth particularly stresses the ‘I in we’, or ‘recognition as a driving force of group 
formation’.25 For him, the transposition of (mis)recognition from the individual to the 
collective level works as a ‘practical process in which individual experiences of disrespect 
are read as typical for an entire group, and in such a way that they can motivate collective 
demands for expanded relations of recognition’.26 Second, the two approaches similarly 
embrace the ‘recognition deficit’ model27 in warning of the damaging effects of the lack 
of recognition or disrespect, and assuming that more recognition would be the logical 
remedy. This normative stance presupposes an optimistic belief in the emancipatory 
                                                          
23 Ibid. p. 49. 
24 Charles Taylor, ‘The Politics of Recognition’, in Charles Taylor and Amy Gutmann (eds), 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 
pp. 25-73. 
25 Axel Honneth, The I in We: Studies in the Theory of Recognition (Cambridge: Polity, 2014), pp. 201-
216. 
26 Honneth (1995) p. 162. 
27 McBride (2013) p. 6. 
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potential of mutual recognition which contrasts with pessimistic views such those of 
Kojève, Sartre28 and Fanon. Fanon29 applied Hegel’s master-servant dialectic to the 
colonial encounter (‘white master’ vs. ‘black slave’) in order to highlight its inherent logic 
of violent appropriation and thus the ‘perpetual, antagonistic struggle of mutual 
objectification’.30 Third, both approaches propose similar tripartite distinctions of the 
forms of recognition, as Honneth’s ‘rights’, ‘solidarity’ and ‘love’ largely correspond to 
Taylor’s ‘politics of universalism’, ‘politics of difference’ and recognition in intimate 
contexts of loving care.31  
 
Another prevailing feature of the recognition scholarship stemming from these two 
accounts, including most of their empirical applications, has been the domestic bias 
entailed by a primary focus on struggles for recognition ‘within national states and 
societies’.32 This analytical restriction does not appear to be intrinsic to the Hegelian 
model or its subsequent theoretical developments, but is rather a matter of methodological 
nationalism. Persuaded of the need to overcome it, a group of scholars within the 
constructivist school of IR have more recently endeavoured to introduce recognition into 
this discipline, making it a core element of sociological and identity-based views of world 
politics.33 Their starting premise is that the same recognition needs and misrecognition 
grievances that shape the identity formation and social status of individuals and groups 
also apply, at a larger scale, to the behaviour of international actors – chiefly states – 
                                                          
28 See Honneth (1995) pp. 58, 156-157. 
29 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (London: Pluto Press, 1952/2008). 
30 Andrew Schaap, ‘Political Reconciliation through a Struggle for Recognition?’, Social and Legal 
Studies, 13:4 (2004), pp. 530-533. 
31 Taylor (1994) pp. 37-38. 
32 Christopher Daase, Caroline Fehl, Anna Geis, and Georgios Kolliarakis (eds.) (2015) Recognition in 
International Relations: Rethinking a Political Concept in a Global Context (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015), pp. 3-4. Shannon Brincat, ‘Recognition, Conflict and the Problem of Ethical 
Community’, Global Discourse, 4:4 (2014), p. 397. 
33 Erik Ringmar, ‘Introduction: The International Politics of Recognition’, in Thomas Lindemann and 
Erik Ringmar (eds) The International Politics of Recognition (Boulder/London: Paradigm, 2012), pp. 3-4. 
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within the social system that is world politics. Besides the issue of corporate agency, this 
involves an ontological move to anthropomorphise the state by attributing to it human 
qualities and subjectivity, whose problematic aspects have been widely discussed in the 
literature.34 On the other hand, bringing recognition theory into IR generates an intriguing 
crossover with the evergreen debates on the formal recognition of statehood in 
international law – where the subjectivity of the state and the social procedures that 
constitute it are not just a metaphor, but a well-established, codified and institutionalised 
set of rules and practices.35 
 
IR scholarship on recognition is still in its infancy and in the process of breaking some 
unwarranted moulds. In empirical terms, (mis)recognition as a driver for state behaviour 
in world politics has been mostly applied to the study of the causes of inter-state war36 
and grievances about disrespect by ‘prickly states’,37 including the latter’s impact on 
hostile bilateral relationships.38 It thus focuses predominantly on the negative side of the 
coin. As a counterpoint, the most unabashed optimist in this discipline has been Wendt, 
who used Hegel’s dialectic and the divide-overcoming view of struggles for recognition 
to argue that the system of states would be inevitably transforming into a single world 
state.39 An alternative, more empirically grounded emancipatory proposal for progressing 
towards cosmopolitanism through recognition has been advanced by Brincat.40 On the 
other hand, another prevailing bias affecting even Wendt’s cosmopolitan teleology is the 
                                                          
34 On the state personhood debate or ‘transfer issue’, see e.g. Mattias Iser, ‘Recognition between States? 
Moving beyond Identity Politics’, in Daase et al. (2015), pp. 27-45.  
35 Axel Honneth, ‘Recognition between States: On the Moral Substrate of International Relations’, in 
Lindemann and Ringmar (2012), pp. 27-28.  
36 Thomas Lindemann, Causes of War: The Struggle for Recognition (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2010). 
37 Reinhard Wolf, ‘Prickly States? Recognition and Disrespect between Persons and Peoples’, in 
Lindemann and Ringmar (2012), pp. 39-56. 
38 Constance Duncombe, ‘Representation, Recognition and Foreign Policy in the Iran-US Relationship’, 
European Journal of International Relations, 22:3 (2016), pp. 622-645. 
39 Wendt (2003). 
40 Brincat (2017). 
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state-centric tendency to consider the nation-state as the primary subject and object of 
recognition in world politics, neglecting non-state actors and ‘recognition processes 
between different individuals and groups across, between and over the state’,41 i.e. 
transnational recognition. 
 
By contrast, the recognition of non-state (conflict) actors has been a central concern for 
the peacebuilding literature. This typically underscores the role of ‘thick recognition’ in 
the transformation of intractable identity-based conflicts, as well as in post-conflict 
reconciliation and the construction of a just peace from a normative standpoint.42 Viewed 
as necessary conditions for these progressive long-term changes to take place, both ‘thin 
recognition’ – the acceptance and acknowledgement of the existence of the other as an 
autonomous agent – and ‘thick recognition’ – the understanding of the other ‘in terms of 
the essential elements composing its identity’ – likewise apply to ‘parties, states, peoples, 
or other such collectives’.43 These kinds of identity reconstruction processes have been 
empirically studied in mostly frozen conflict contexts such as Northern Ireland,44 their 
Western Balkans45 and Israel-Palestine.46 In focusing on inter-community relations, the 
analysis has a primarily domestic focus. In addition, the normative stress on the possibility 
of identity change and the erosion of difference enabled by recognition47 leads to 
recognition dynamics being almost uniformly portrayed as positive and constructive. 
                                                          
41 Brincat (2014) p. 398. Brincat (2017) p. 3-4. 
42 Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller, ‘Is a Just Peace Possible without Thin and Thick Recognition?’, in 
Lindemann and Ringmar (2012), pp. 71-84. Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl (eds), Rethinking 
Peacebuilding: The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and the Western Balkans (Oxon/New York: 
Routledge, 2013). 
43 Allan and Keller (2012) pp. 76-77. 
44 See Shane O’Neill and Nicholas H. Smith (eds), Recognition Theory as Social Research: Investigating 
the Dynamics of Social Conflict (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
45 Aggestam and Björkdahl (2013). 
46 Lisa Strömbom, ‘Thick Recognition: Advancing Theory on Identity Change in Intractable Conflicts’, 
European Journal of International Relations, 20:1 (2014), pp. 168-191. 
47 Allan and Keller (2012) pp. 77-78. 
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There is little consideration for their potentially dual, counterproductive or ‘normatively 
undesirable’ effects48 in conflict contexts, including the role that incomplete or flawed 
forms of recognition might play in deepening the differences between the self and the 
other.49 Rather than a hidden ‘dark side’, the (re)generation of the struggle for recognition 
when mutuality is not achieved is actually intrinsic to the theory.50 
 
3. Towards a typology of causal mechanisms of transnational recognition in frozen 
conflicts 
 
In short, a few exceptions aside, the existing IR scholarship on recognition tends to look 
at the negative side of the coin and remains largely state-centric, neglecting the struggles 
for recognition of non-state actors beyond the state framework. Conversely, much of the 
peacebuilding literature optimistically understates the unintended consequences of – and 
the political conflict that is intrinsic to – the mutual recognition it prescribes, and is 
empirically weighed down by its primarily domestic focus. Due to their respective 
limitations, this article argues that none of these perspectives is capable of capturing the 
full extent and complexity of the role played by recognition in frozen conflicts. Instead, 
the causal mechanisms at work are better understood as transnational recognition 
processes producing contingent effects. Insights from the scholarship on transnationalism 
provide a necessary corrective to some of the aforementioned blind spots.  
 
This section lays the theoretical foundations for a typology of the causal mechanisms of 
transnational recognition involved in the constitution of conflict actors in frozen conflicts 
                                                          
48 Daase et al. (2015) p. 6. 
49 Brian Greenhill, ‘Recognition and Collective Identity Formation in International Politics’, European 
Journal of International Relations, 14:2 (2008), p. 352. 
50 Point raised by anonymous reviewer. 
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– the deductive element which will be later confronted with inductive insights from the 
empirical case study. It proceeds in two steps: discussing the theoretical challenges of 
adapting Honneth’s theory for this purpose and making three additional transnational 
corrections. Assuming that an experience of disrespect and a struggle for recognition are 
always present on the part of any new conflict actor, the mechanisms of recognition 
included in the typology correspond to the significant others’ responses to it. These may 
vary along two dimensions: significant others and forms of recognition. The potential 
range of significant others for a newcomer in a frozen conflict context typically includes 
a mix of state, inter-state, non-state and in-between ‘liminal’51 actors: the ‘de facto’,52 
‘unrecognised’53 or ‘contested state’54 lying at the heart of the dispute, the ‘parent state’ 
from which it aims to secede – or ‘annexing state’ in non-secessionist cases such as 
Western Sahara –, the ‘patron state’ on which it relies for its political and economic 
survival, non-state actors associated with any of the aforementioned states or properly 
transnational in nature, other foreign states, and regional and international 
organisations.55 
 
As far as forms of recognition are concerned, my typology follows the classical tripartite 
division made by Honneth,56 yet adding an extra, non-normative cognitive layer as 
suggested by Ringmar.57 Building on Hegel and Mead, Honneth’s first form of 
recognition is the ‘love’ given to individuals in the context of primary social relationships 
                                                          
51 Maria Mälksoo, ‘The Challenge of Liminality for International Relations Theory’, Review of 
International Studies, 38:2 (2012), pp. 481-494. 
52 Scott Pegg, International Society and the de Facto State (Farnham: Ashgate, 1998). 
53 Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield (eds), Unrecognized States in the International System 
(Oxon/New York: Routledge, 2011). 
54 Geldenhuys (2009). 
55 Nina Caspersen, ‘Playing the Recognition Game: External Actors and De Facto States’, The 
International Spectator, 44:4 (2009), pp. 47-60. 
56 Honneth (1995) pp. 92-130. 
57 Ringmar (2012) p. 7. 
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(parent-child, family, friendship and love affairs) which cover their most basic physical 
and emotional security necessities as ‘needy creatures’.58 While naturally belonging to 
small circles, there is room to generalise ‘love’ to forms of affection, empathy and 
affiliation provided at the collective level, as long as they involve or support close human 
contact and care.59 Secondly, recognition as ‘respect’ or ‘rights’ refers to a relationship 
whereby ‘ego and alter mutually recognise each other as legal persons, in that they share 
a knowledge of those norms by which their particular community superintends the rights 
and responsibilities which they are equally entitled’.60 This corresponds to the modern 
liberal idea of universal human rights assigning equal status and dignity to all people, as 
well as to Taylor’s ‘politics of universalism’. Thirdly, recognition as ‘esteem’ or 
‘solidarity’ is directed ‘at the particular qualities that characterise people in their personal 
difference’ as individuals.61 Extrapolated to larger identity-based social groups such as 
gender, ethnic, religious and cultural minority communities, this recognition of 
particularity underpins Taylor’s ‘politics of difference’.  
 
Adapting this triad for the purpose of a typology of mechanisms of transnational 
recognition in frozen conflicts poses three important theoretical challenges. The first of 
them is that of empirically operationalising a theory with normative foundations as deep 
as Honneth’s, which is anchored in the belief in the emancipatory potential of mutual 
recognition or, absent this, struggles therefor. Against the normative ideal of mutuality, 
real-world recognition relations often appear to be ‘only partial, one-sided, and thereby 
not only radically incomplete but a form of misrecognition’.62 Honneth himself admits 
                                                          
58 Honneth (1995) p. 95. Axel Honneth, ‘Integrity and Disrespect: Principles of a Conception of Morality 
Based on the Theory of Recognition’, Political Theory, 20:2 (1992), p. 193. 
59 See Brincat (2017) pp. 14-15. 
60 Honneth (1992) p. 194. 
61 Honneth (1995) p. 122. 
62 Brincat (2014) p. 400. 
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that many empirical situations never attain such ideal and ‘not all struggles for recognition 
necessarily lead to moral progress’.63 Faced with this dilemma, the typology opts for 
operationalising mechanisms of recognition in a looser, non-normative fashion, so as to 
not exclude from the start behaviour driven by strategic/instrumental rationality and 
material interest and/or occurring ‘within asymmetric power relations’.64 As will be 
shown below in the case study, this does not preclude awareness of the normatively 
flawed nature of such recognition dynamics, which may explain their contingent 
outcomes or ‘dark side’. The second challenge concerns the transfer of Honneth’s three 
forms of recognition into the domain of IR, which he himself has said he is unconvinced 
about, for ‘unlike social groups or movements […] national collectives are far too 
amorphous for us to be able to make comparable differentiations’.65 However, such 
scepticism manifestly refers to inter-state international relations. Various authors have 
deemed it unwarranted66 especially when it comes to transnational recognition of non-
state actors,67 like the one addressed in this article. 
 
The third challenge and admitted departure from Honneth’s core theory lies in adding to 
his triad a fourth, non-normative form of recognition, i.e. the most elementary cognitive 
acknowledgement of the existence and autonomy of a subject by others. This 
understanding of being ‘recognised in the sense of being noticed’68 is somehow found in 
translation, as the German language has two different words for (re)cognition in the 
epistemic sense (Wiedererkennung) and the practical status-granting sense 
                                                          
63 Jürgen Haacke, ‘The Frankfurt School and International Relations: On the Centrality of Recognition’, 
Review of International Studies, 31:1 (2005), p. 189. 
64 Daase et al. (2015) pp. 5-6, 15-16. 
65 Honneth (2012) pp. 32-33. 
66 Michelle Murray, ‘Differentiating Recognition in International Politics’, Global Discourse, 4:4 (2014), 
p. 558. Haacke (2005) p. 193. 
67 Brincat (2017) p. 12. 
68 Ringmar (2012) p. 7. 
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(Anerkennung).69 Honneth has more recently discussed acts whereby an actor ‘takes note 
of, or cognises, an empirical reality’, yet making it clear that ‘this type of recognition […] 
is not normative but instead expresses […] cognition of a given state of affairs’ – 
‘cognition rather than re-cognition’.70 He has also supported the non-normative vs. 
normative distinction along the lines of the ‘thin’ vs. ‘thick’ recognition introduced by 
Wendt71 and later developed in the peacebuilding literature (see above),72 with only ‘thick 
recognition’ being liable to being broken down into his ‘love’, ‘respect’ and ‘esteem’.73 
Therefore, incorporating ‘thin’ or ‘minimal’ recognition74 into the typology advanced 
here makes sense as long as their distinct non-normative nature is taken into 
consideration.75 
 
As a second step, in order to discern the significant others and causal mechanisms that 
are contextually fit for frozen conflict conditions, this taxonomy needs to be accompanied 
by three transnational corrections. The scholarship on transnationalism76 puts forward 
three core analytical commitments: crossing borders – not only substantive state 
boundaries but also the intellectual ones posed by levels of analysis in IR –, paying due 
attention to non-state actors, and prioritising process over stasis. This is exactly what the 
typology proposed here requires in order to bring to the fore three realities, overcoming 
the artificial dichotomies that obscure them. The first of them is the importance of 
transnational relations of recognition cutting across state boundaries and the domestic vs. 
                                                          
69 See translator’s note in Honneth (1995) p. viii. 
70 Honneth (2012) p. 28. 
71 Wendt (2003) pp. 511-512. 
72 Allan and Keller (2012). Strömbom (2014). 
73 Axel Honneth, ‘Rejoinder’, Global Discourse, 4:4 (2014), p. 564. 
74 Lindemann (2010) p. 25. 
75 Besides Ringmar’s, another fourfold distinction of types of international recognition can be found in 
Iser (2015) pp. 36-40. 
76 See Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In:  Non-State Actors, 
Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Ithaca, NY/London: Cornell University Press, 1995). 
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international divide. The added value of transnationalism lies in embracing an ‘open 
polity perspective’, ‘[moving] well beyond level-of-analysis approaches […] to 
emphasise cross-level interactions that put the spotlight on process’.77 As argued above, 
Honneth’s recognition theory and typology seem to work far better in IR when 
extrapolated to transnational relations than in the purely inter-state realm. Some of his 
followers have rightly pointed out that ‘[…] there is nothing in Honneth’s version of 
recognition theory […] which precludes the possibility of struggles for recognition 
expanding any given cultural horizon across the boundaries of political, ethnic, or 
religious communities’.78 
 
The second transnational correction aims to overcome the gulf between analyses of state 
and non-state actors, acknowledging the struggles for international/transnational 
recognition of the latter. Underscoring the role of non-state actors in world politics has 
been a constant concern for the literature on transnationalism since the 1970s, while the 
focus has shifted from economic actors to the transnational non-profit sector, and radical 
anti-state-centric ambitions have been abandoned to deal instead with the interactions 
between state and non-state actors.79 Both of these trends are relevant to the analysis of 
recognition mechanisms in frozen conflicts, where non-state actors tend to belong to the 
category of civil society or social movements, being immersed in contentious 
transnational politics, and seek recognition by engaging with significant others of both 
state and non-state nature. Moreover, not only do non-state actors care about 
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international/transnational recognition as much or more than states, but also, in the 
context of frozen conflicts, a number of significant recognition relations occur in the grey 
zones populated by liminal international actors that are ‘betwixt and between’ these two 
categories, as is the case with contested states. 
 
The third dichotomy in need of a transnational correction concerns the conventional 
dualistic view of recognition in international law – either an actor (i.e. a state) is 
recognised or it is not. Based on a sociological view of world politics informed by 
recognition theory, there exist unstructured, social and relational forms of 
international/transnational recognition that are analytically distinct from the legal black-
and-white terms.80 Transnational social recognition results instead from an actor’s 
practical accumulation of transnational engagements and interactions, without necessarily 
ever crossing, or implying the existence of, a specific threshold or benchmark. From this 
perspective, and relatedly to the previous point, the recognition needs and aspirations of 
state and non-state actors do not appear to be dramatically different. When it comes to 
international policy responses to their various struggles, a long continuum exists that 
‘runs from highly formalised to extremely informal modes of recognition, and from the 
recognition of non-state actors and other political collectives as legitimate negotiating 
partners to the recognition of entities as sovereign states and as states with specific 
entitlements’.81 
 
 
 
                                                          
80 Dimitris Bouris and Irene Fernández-Molina, ‘Contested States, Hybrid Diplomatic Practices and the 
Everyday Quest for Recognition’, International Political Sociology, 12:3 (2018), pp. 306-324. 
81 Daase et al. (2015) p. 16. 
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4. Recognition dynamics in frozen conflicts and the case of Western Sahara 
 
Now, besides the range of actors involved, the context of frozen conflict itself has some 
specific effects on transnational recognition dynamics, as this section endeavours to show 
with reference to the case of Western Sahara. First, although the basic incompatibility 
between the parties remains unresolved, the absence of large-scale violence allows for a 
relative institutional stability and avenues for non-coercive political change. Whereas 
military means arguably ‘undermine the very (normative) basis’ of any recognition 
order,82 conflict freezing enables new engagements and relations of recognition between 
multiple conflict actors to flourish, whether driven by instrumental rationality or 
involving proper mutuality. In the case of Western Sahara, the conflict originated in 1975-
1976 as a result of neighbouring state(s)’ occupation and annexation of the colonial 
territory of the Spanish Sahara in the context of a thwarted decolonisation process. In its 
first incarnation, this unfolded as a 15-year open armed confrontation pitting the Polisario 
Front – the Sahrawi national liberation movement based in the Tindouf refugee camps in 
southwestern Algeria, where half of the indigenous Sahrawi population fled – against 
Morocco and Mauritania. The internationally recognised conflict parties were soon 
reduced to two, i.e. Morocco vs. the Polisario Front, following Mauritania’s withdrawal 
in 1979. The intensity of armed combat, compounded with the utter isolation of the 
Moroccan-annexed Western Sahara, prevented the Sahrawis who stayed there from 
engaging in meaningful and stable recognition relationships. Even at the level of ‘love’, 
for years these internal Sahrawis were virtually cut off from their families in exile. It was 
not until the conflict froze following the 1991 UN-sponsored ceasefire and Settlement 
Plan, accepted by both parties, that the internal Sahrawi struggles for recognition began 
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to emerge. These would turn out to be the most significant frozen conflict dynamic in 
subsequent years, as the implementation of the self-determination referendum for the 
Sahrawi people provided for by the UN Settlement Plan stalled due to the parties’ 
insuperable disagreement about the electorate entitled to vote. 
 
The second effect of frozen conflict on transnational recognition dynamics relates to the 
particular susceptibility of contested states to the latter. As Voller has argued, the 
persistent ‘crisis of legitimacy’ that results from their limited to no international 
recognition in the conventional legal sense tends to make contested states hyperactive in 
their communicative (inter)action with the international community, and therefore more 
vulnerable to external ‘standards of recognition and legitimacy’.83 On the other hand, 
wary of ‘creeping recognition’ being inferred from their dealings with contested states, 
international actors often resort to diplomatic practices of what they see as ‘engagement 
without recognition’84. Both of these trends may be seen as consequences of the (relative) 
comeback, in the post-Cold War era, of the ‘constitutive theory’ of statehood in 
international law, which emphasises criteria of legitimacy, ‘earned sovereignty’ and 
collective endorsement/recognition by other states, after centuries of predominance of the 
modern ‘declaratory theory’, which prioritises purely functional/effectiveness features 
such as the Montevideo Convention criteria.85 In the case of Western Sahara this applies 
to the SADR, which interestingly, as a primarily extraterritorial state-in-exile lacking 
control over (most of) the territory it claims, does better in terms of constitutive statehood 
than declaratory statehood. The SADR’s struggle for recognition relies on hybrid 
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diplomatic practices and seeks a combination of conventional-legal and social-relational 
forms of international/transnational recognition.86 
 
Thirdly, when it comes to non-state actors of frozen conflicts, relations of recognition 
tend to be on the whole transnational, as the significant others with whom they engage – 
contested state, parent/annexing state, patron state and international actors – are located 
on different levels of analysis, and multiple mutual influences and cross-level interactions 
occur between parallel recognition dynamics. Most prominently, there is an inevitable 
tension between recognition from the contested state and parent/annexing state, which 
reflects the practical alternative between pursuing the ‘politics of recognition’ ‘via 
secessionist efforts […] or […] via demands for complete administrative self-governance 
as autonomy for a political entity within a given state’.87 At the same time, recognition 
from the international community may influence that of either the parent/annexing state 
or the contested state by creating – through mechanisms such as international socialisation 
– a ‘transnational structure pressuring such governments simultaneously “from above” 
and “from below”, hence minimising options for repression’.88  
 
In the case of the internal Sahrawi pro-independence groups whose emergence as a new 
non-state conflict actor is examined in this article, recognition from the Moroccan state 
is a necessity as part of the domestic political constraints imposed by this country’s 
annexation – i.e. full territorial and administrative incorporation – of (three quarters of) 
Western Sahara. Whatever the preferences of various internal Sahrawi actors and the view 
of international law, which regards Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory 
                                                          
86 Bouris and Fernández-Molina (2018). 
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awaiting decolonisation, the facts on the ground are that Morocco has acted there as the 
sole de facto governing authority since 1976/1979. By contrast, the internal Sahrawi 
nationalists’ struggle for recognition from the Polisario Front/SADR occurs on a national 
yet cross-border and extraterritorial level. Both the national liberation movement 
formally recognised by the UN as ‘the representative of the people of Western Sahara’89 
and the contested state it proclaimed in 1976 are mostly based in exile, in the Tindouf 
refugee camps in Algeria. Finally, recognition from what is here referred to as the 
international community – a shortcut for the UN and mainly Western actors such as the 
United States, the European Union (EU) and key European states – belongs to a wider 
global level.  
 
Figure 1. Transnational relations of recognition and significant others for internal Sahrawi 
pro-independence groups 
 
 
 
                                                          
89 UN General Assembly, A/RES/34/37 (21 November 1979). 
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5. Transnational mechanisms of recognition for the internal Sahrawi nationalists 
 
This section aims to complete the building of the typology of causal mechanisms of 
transnational recognition involved in the constitution of conflict actors in frozen conflicts 
by incorporating inductive insights from the empirical case study. The case study 
examines the emergence and constitution (collective identity formation and social status 
building) of internal Sahrawi pro-independence groups as a new non-state conflict actor 
in the frozen conflict of Western Sahara by means of their transnational recognition 
struggles and responses thereto from three significant others – the Moroccan state, the 
Polisario Front/SADR and the international community. Evidence is drawn from semi-
structured individual and group interviews with prominent activists from all the 
significant pro-independence Sahrawi civil society organisations active in the Moroccan-
annexed Western Sahara territory, which I conducted in the capital city Laayoune in June 
2013. The main limitations of these data stem from the stifling Moroccan security control 
in this hard-to-research field90 and my lesser direct access to the views of the three 
significant others during this trip. However, my interviews included several Moroccan 
academics and think tankers in Rabat and Casablanca as well as the head of the regional 
commission of the Moroccan National Human Rights Council (CNDH) in Laayoune. 
Additional data about the significant others’ motivations stem from my previous research 
on Moroccan foreign policy and the interplay between this state’s domestic and 
international management of the Western Sahara conflict,91 the multilevel analysis of this 
conflict92 and the role of the EU therein.93 
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The typology in Table 1 classifies mechanisms of recognition, i.e. the pathways or 
processes whereby responses to the internal Sahrawi nationalists’ struggles are produced, 
by combining the two dimensions – forms of recognition and significant others. Although 
the range of potential significant others in a frozen conflict context is wider (see above), 
the list here is limited to those that play a most relevant role in this particular case. 
Similarly, causal mechanisms are identified on an inductive, case-specific basis, and do 
not purport to be exhaustive. 
 
Table 1. Causal mechanisms of transnational recognition for (non-state) conflict actor 
(internal Sahrawi pro-independence groups) in frozen conflict (Western Sahara) 
   Significant others 
   Annexing/parent 
state 
Contested state International 
community 
   Morocco Polisario Front/ 
SADR 
UN, US, EU 
Forms 
of 
recog-
nition 
Non-
normative 
Thin cognitive 
recognition 
Media coverage - Media coverage 
Normative Respect 
(equal rights) 
International 
socialisation 
Competitive 
recognition 
Official on-the-
ground 
engagement 
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Esteem 
(difference) 
Institution-
building and co-
optation 
- - 
Love 
(empathy) 
- Civil society and 
people-to-people 
contacts 
Civil society 
and people-to-
people contacts 
 
5.1. Thin cognitive recognition from the annexing state and the international 
community through media coverage 
 
Internal Sahrawi nationalists supportive of independence and/or the Polisario 
Front/SADR within the Moroccan-annexed Western Sahara were denied to even exist for 
nearly two decades. After half of their country people fled into exile in the Tindouf 
refugee camps upon the outbreak of the conflict in 1975-1976, and the territory became 
virtually isolated, the Moroccan state acted as though none of them was left there. Secretly 
detained activists were subject to one of the most extreme forms of disrespect at the level 
of physical integrity discussed by Honneth, i.e. torture.94 At the same time, these Sahrawis 
were simply invisible for the international community and politically sidelined by the 
Polisario Front/SADR leadership in exile in Algeria. The only primary form of 
recognition they enjoyed was the ‘love’ provided by their relatives and friends privately 
– and locally, as most Sahrawi families were divided. Starting from this situation of utter 
disrespect, two practical conditions were required for their first struggles for recognition 
to begin in the early 1990s: the freezing of the conflict and the cognitive 
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acknowledgement of their existence and autonomy by the Moroccan annexing state and 
the international community. 
 
The first step towards this thin or minimal cognitive recognition, lacking normative 
implications, was Morocco’s first-ever release of Sahrawi political prisoners and 
‘disappeared’, whose existence had been denied until then, in the context of the 1991 UN 
Settlement Plan and the deployment of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara (MINURSO). By being freed, these 240-300 Sahrawis who had been in Moroccan 
secret detention centres since 1976 or 198895 were, most importantly, acknowledged to 
exist. This started to constitute the identity of the embryonic conflict actor they were at 
the time, first and foremost, as victims of the Moroccan state, their primary significant 
other. Such is the positionality suggested by the name adopted in 1994 by the first 
informal grouping formed by these activists upon their return to Western Sahara, i.e. 
Coordination Committee of Sahrawi Victims of Enforced Disappearances (henceforth the 
Coordination Committee). Once they returned home and recovered their basic self-
confidence through the ‘love’ from their families, these victims’ experience of disrespect 
pushed them to engage in a wider struggle for recognition. Before growing into a struggle 
for rights, this was essentially a ‘struggle for dignity’ whereby the new actors fought their 
‘denial of agency’, ‘rooted in asymmetrical interaction patterns’.96 For instance, the first 
major action the Coordination Committee undertook was to dispatch a clandestine 
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delegation to Rabat with the aim of simply make themselves known, establishing contacts 
with Moroccan opposition groups and foreign actors.97  
 
The causal mechanism behind the Moroccan decision in the 1991 prisoner release is 
unclear for lack of evidence. What is apparent, however, is that from the late 1990s 
onwards, it was media coverage of the budding struggle for recognition inside Western 
Sahara that acted as the mechanism driving thin cognitive recognition of internal Sahrawi 
pro-independence groups, both by the Moroccan state and further afield. The opening 
episode was a wave of Sahrawi protests that broke out in Laayoune in September 1999 – 
the first ever to be put on front pages by some Moroccan media. Met with violent 
repression, what began as a peaceful sit-in of Sahrawi students expressing social demands 
escalated into several weeks of riots. The unprecedented scope of these events led the 
then young and vibrant Moroccan ‘independent press’, which was actively pushing the 
official ‘red lines’ including on Western Sahara,98 to give them widespread coverage. 
This can be viewed as an act of thin cognitive recognition that, as a matter of simple fact, 
unrest existed in Western Sahara. The limit was that such recognition was kept minimal 
and carefully depoliticised at the official level. Moroccan media received explicit 
governmental instructions to frame these protests as exclusively driven by socioeconomic 
grievances, refraining from attributing to them any ‘political’ or Sahrawi nationalist 
content. As put by a Moroccan minister, ‘one can be Moroccan and be in rage’.99 Even 
just at the non-normative level of thin cognitive recognition, this amputated framing 
involved a good deal of misrecognition and therefore fuelled renewed, up-levelling 
Sahrawi struggles. 
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It took half a decade and another larger and more widely mediatised Sahrawi protest-riot 
cycle to get some Moroccan acknowledgement of the existence of internal ‘separatists’ 
cast in overtly political terms. The so-called Sahrawi ‘intifada’ that erupted in Laayoune 
in May 2005 not only represented a quantitative leap in terms of mobilisation, 
organisation, duration and geographical spread, but also a political turning point. This 
time, the protests included the open use of pro-independence symbols, and received 
greater attention from international as well as Moroccan media.100 Still, even in the face 
of such upgrade, Moroccan cognitive recognition of internal Sahrawi pro-independence 
groups would remain partial and tainted by disrespect, insofar as the activists concerned 
were persistently denied of agency, represented as ‘agents’ and a ‘fifth column’ of the 
Polisario Front and Algeria rather than an autonomous social movement. 
 
In fact, the 2005 ‘intifada’ was more important for the internal Sahrawi groups’ struggles 
for recognition vis-à-vis their other two significant others. Media coverage was also the 
causal mechanism that enabled the internal Sahrawi nationalists to be noticed as conflict 
actors by the international community. By this point, rather than mass media, it was the 
internet that became instrumental for the global dissemination of images of the brutal 
Moroccan crackdown against Sahrawi demonstrators. They took them themselves with 
digital cameras or mobile phones, and thus framed in their own, often nationalist, terms. 
The most impactful move in this regard was the smuggling of a small camera into the 
Black Prison in Laayoune which produced pictures, subsequently spread online, of the 
inhuman conditions in which the arrested activists were kept.101 Their struggle for 
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international cognitive recognition would later be further advanced through the crises 
provoked by the expulsion and hunger strike of the Sahrawi activist Aminatou Haidar in 
2009, and the protest camp set up at Gdeim Izik, Laayoune, in 2010. The importance for 
activists of the mere acknowledgement of their existence in the outside world is nicely 
illustrated by the title of a documentary film about one of the Gdeim Izik prisoners, Tell 
Them I Exist (2016). Meanwhile, when it comes to the Polisario Front/SADR, the internal 
Sahrawi groups had no need of cognitive recognition as such; they had not been forgotten. 
Yet, the 2005 ‘intifada’ helped the exiled Sahrawi national leadership realise their 
political potential in a critical moment of diplomatic deadlock and frustration.  
 
5.2. Recognition as ‘respect’/equal rights from the annexing state through 
international socialisation 
 
Their burgeoning cognitive recognition, combined with persistent Moroccan disrespect, 
motivated internal Sahrawi pro-independence groups to extend their struggle to the 
domain of rights, engaging in fights for freedom of association and for the Moroccan 
state’s accountability and reparation for the gross human rights violations committed 
throughout the Western Sahara conflict. The Moroccan state responded with a number of 
rights-based recognition measures directed towards the entirety of the Sahrawi population 
of the annexed territory – yet as Moroccan citizens/subjects. In other words, rather than 
involving mutuality and genuine acceptance of the other, these were largely policies of 
assimilation seeking to ‘normalise the other by reducing them to oneself’.102 Neither did 
they correspond to the normative ideal of recognition in terms of causal mechanisms, as 
they were mostly driven by instrumental rationality. It is here that the transnational 
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connection comes into play. The two processes leading the Moroccan state to extend 
equal rights and state-wide human rights policies to the internal Sahrawis were the latter’s 
growing recognition by the international community and Morocco’s international 
socialisation in the form of ‘role playing’.103 Role-playing refers to learning what is 
socially accepted and expected within the context of an asymmetric relationship – such 
as those that Morocco maintains with its Western foreign policy allies – and adopting new 
roles accordingly, without necessarily involving normative persuasion.104 Greater respect 
for the civil and political rights of the Sahrawis living in under Moroccan rule belongs to 
the external normative expectations that the authorities in Rabat felt compelled to live up 
to, in order to grant credibility to their ‘democratic transition’ discourse and to 
internationally legitimise their new plans of autonomy (under Moroccan sovereignty) for 
Western Sahara. 
 
The first policy step in this direction, soon after King Mohammed VI’s accession to the 
throne in 1999, was the establishment of an Independent Arbitration Committee with the 
aim of closing down the issue of the human rights violations of the reign of his father, 
King Hassan II, by providing material compensations to the victims. Although it did not 
specifically target them, the appearance of a limited transitional justice mechanism 
immediately appealed to the internal Sahrawi nationalists who had precisely formed a 
collective identity as human rights victims. The Coordination Committee responded by 
submitting a joint collective application including some 1,200 files on human rights 
violations, though emphasising the need for truth and justice in addition to 
compensations.105 The neglect of the second demand turned the first Moroccan act of 
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rights-based recognition into a mere one-sided pecuniary transaction, and therefore more 
of a form of misrecognition. Thus, counterproductively for Moroccan interests, the policy 
contributed to bringing together internal Sahrawi nationalists in their new struggle for 
rights, led to a shift in these groups’ collective identity from mere victims to human rights 
activists, and expanded the horizon of their significant others to the international sphere. 
 
Another example of the limits of the expansion of political rights for internal Sahrawis 
and the stepping-up of the latter’s recognition struggles was the short-lived adventure of 
the Sahara Section of the Forum for Truth and Justice (FVJ). The FVJ was a quite militant 
and pluralist Moroccan civil society group that emerged in the same context of Moroccan 
‘transitional’ politics and was unprecedentedly open to Sahrawi activists. Its Sahara 
Section, established in Laayoune in 2000, became the first legal and fully operational 
independent civil society organisation in the Moroccan-annexed Western Sahara that 
mostly consisted of Sahrawi members106 because, as one of them noted, ‘the FVJ was an 
association of victims’.107 However, the involvement of noted pro-independence activists 
and the denunciation of present-day human rights violations, including briefings provided 
to international delegations (the transnational element), created constant strain with the 
Moroccan authorities and the FVJ’s central executive board in Rabat. The FVJ’s Sahara 
Section was eventually dissolved by the Laayoune Court of First Instance in 2003 on the 
grounds that it was using ‘human rights as a cover to pursue both violent and diplomatic 
“separatist” activities’.108  
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A second phase of rights-based recognition policies driven by Morocco’s international 
socialisation started in 2004, when Mohammed VI raised the transitional justice stakes in 
keeping with global norms. A full-fledged truth commission was put in place to redress 
the 1956-1999 abuses – though still in the contradictory context of persisting 
authoritarianism. The so-called Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER) aroused an 
unusually strong response and expectations among Sahrawi victims-activists, who 
accounted for as much as 23 per cent of the complainants. In 2005, former members of 
the Coordination Committee created the Sahrawi Association of Victims of Gross Human 
Rights Violations Committed by the Moroccan State (ASVDH). Yet, all of this 
excitement was doomed to result in even greater disappointment. Not only was Western 
Sahara excluded from the collective reparations programme devised for some Moroccan 
regions, but also the public hearing scheduled in Laayoune was eventually cancelled, and 
the Sahrawis were almost absent from the other hearings. Later on, when the IER’s report 
and lists of victims entitled to individual compensation were released in 2006 and 2010, 
the Sahrawi activists felt they had been just ‘treated like numbers’.109 The IER failed as a 
rights-based recognition policy as, ‘rather than addressing the particular breadth of 
violations suffered by Sahrawis, [it] increased their feelings of marginalisation’.110 This 
disrespect in the form of ‘denial of rights’111 had the effect of reinforcing their identity as 
an excluded political subject apart from equal Moroccan human rights victims and 
activists. They were also activists involved in an unsolved conflict, as suggested by the 
ASVDH’s founding motto – ‘no justice without truth, no reconciliation without a global 
solution’ – and confirmed by the unleashing of a critical chapter of their struggle for 
recognition, the 2005 Sahrawi ‘intifada’. The aftermath of the ‘intifada’ also saw another 
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more militant internal Sahrawi pro-independence group emerge. Haidar and other figures 
of the best-connected civil society elite of the territory, all former members of the 
dissolved FVJ’s Sahara Section, founded the Collective of Sahrawi Defenders of Human 
Rights (CODESA) in 2007.  
 
By 2011, when the Arab Uprisings and the Gdeim Izik protest led to a third phase in 
Morocco’s rights-based recognition policies for the Sahrawis, the head of the Laayoune 
regional commission of the refurbished Moroccan National Human Rights Council 
(CNDH) no longer hid that the human rights issues he dealt with were embedded in a 
‘political conflict’.112 In any case, Rabat’s new measures appeared to be more than ever 
driven by instrumental rationality in the face of new US pressure over human rights in 
the Western Sahara territory. This was made clear by leaks of a secret verbal agreement 
reached by Mohammed VI and President Barack Obama in November 2013, whereby the 
latter committed himself to stopping seeking the UN Security Council’s extension of the 
MINURSO mandate to monitor human rights in exchange for Morocco making three 
specific concessions: allowing the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) to visit Western Sahara, putting an end to military trials of civilians and 
authorising Sahrawi civil society organisations deprived of legal status.113 The first two 
conditions were met, at least formally, in the ensuing years. Technical missions of 
OHCHR visited Laayoune and Dakhla in 2014 and 2015. A new Code on Military Justice 
ending military trials of civilians was passed in 2015, which led the Moroccan Court of 
Cassation to order the full retrial of 23 Sahrawis convicted by a military court in the 
Gdeim Izik case. 114 Still, with regard to the legalisation of Sahrawi associations, 
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Moroccan rights-based recognition remained restrictive. Only the ASVDH was verbally 
authorised and allowed to open an office in Laayoune in 2015-2016, while CODESA and 
others stayed in legal limbo.115 
 
These were the last of a series of partial and half-hearted Moroccan rights-based 
recognition policies driven by ‘role playing’ mechanisms of international socialisation 
and seeking the assimilation of the Sahrawi other rather than proper mutuality. Such 
strategic approach turned out to be largely self-defeating for Moroccan interests because, 
as expected by Honneth’s theory, it created new Sahrawi experiences of disrespect and 
generated ever-growing struggles for recognition. 
 
5.3. Recognition as ‘respect’/equal rights from the contested state through competitive 
recognition 
 
In parallel to these dynamics playing out within the domestic Moroccan state sphere, 
though with transnational connections, internal Sahrawi pro-independence groups also 
started to struggle for greater recognition from the Polisario Front/SADR on the national-
extraterritorial level. In this relationship, the triggering experience of disrespect occurred 
mainly in the form of ‘denial of rights’, or ‘being structurally excluded from the 
possession of certain rights within a society’.116 On the part of the Polisario Front/SADR, 
the timing of the rights-based recognition measures adopted suggests that they arose in 
response to those of the Moroccan state and the international community – the two other 
significant others. Thus, the causal mechanism at work here may be seen as one of 
competitive recognition involving strategic calculation. The rising international salience 
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of the issue of human rights within the Moroccan-annexed territory pushed the Polisario 
Front/SADR to try and capitalise on this newfound publicity. They did so by turning it 
into the cornerstone of a new diplomatic strategy while preventing Moroccan co-optation 
attempts of internal Sahrawi activists, as well as the Sahrawi population at large. At the 
same time, in spite of this instrumental rationality, the Polisario Front/SADR’s rights-
based recognition was arguably much more sincere and genuine in terms of mutuality 
than that of the Moroccan state, which explains its differing, unity-building effects. 
 
Polisario Front/SADR rights-based recognition started to materialise from 2009 onwards 
in response to the internal Sahrawi groups’ agency. The turning point was a 
groundbreaking official visit to the Tindouf refugee camps by seven internal Sahrawi pro-
independence leaders from the most prominent organisations (ASVDH, CODESA), who 
wanted to test the limits of the increased freedom of movement granted at the time by 
Rabat117 in order to overtly engage with the Polisario Front/SADR’s leadership.118 In spite 
of the Moroccan arrest of the so-called ‘group of seven’ upon their return home, this two-
week mission set a precedent and became the first of a series of increasingly frequent and 
visible official trips from Laayoune to Tindouf. More importantly, internal Sahrawis had 
broken a taboo which would gain them the right to directly participate in the Polisario 
Front’s grassroots political organ, the Popular General Congress (PGC), on an equal 
footing with their refugee counterparts. Convened every four years, the PGC elects the 
national liberation movement’s National Secretariat and secretary-general, who in the 
absence of other parties, also holds the state-like position of president of the SADR.119 
Although the constituencies entitled to designate delegates for the PGC had already 
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included the ‘occupied territories’ and diaspora communities on previous occasions, it 
was only at the 13th PGC, held in Tifariti in December 2011, that representatives from 
Moroccan-annexed Western Sahara actually attended for the first time since 1991.120 The 
internal Sahrawi delegation comprised 54 activists from organisations such as CODESA, 
ASVDH and others, who enjoyed the same voting rights as the rest of the congress 
delegates,121 and were engaged in the so-called Commission for the Occupied Territories 
and the Intifada of Independence.122 With all of its competitive and strategic dimension, 
this inter-Sahrawi recognition actually brought about reciprocity and equal political 
participation rights, forging a quite durable and effective alliance. 
 
5.4. Recognition as ‘respect’/equal rights from the international community through 
official engagement on the ground 
 
When it comes to the third significant other, the international community, the principal 
causal mechanism of recognition as ‘respect’ or equal rights for the Sahrawi population 
of the Moroccan-annexed Western Sahara in general, and internal Sahrawi pro-
independence groups in particular, has been official presence and engagement on the 
ground from both foreign states and international organisations. This has not supposed a 
straightforward expansion of rights in the legal-institutional sense, given the absence of 
international governance mechanisms at the local level, but has countered the inclination 
towards neglect and unequal treatment that has characterised the international 
management of the Western Sahara conflict.123 As much as international actors generally 
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limit their interaction with contested states and associated non-state actors in order to 
prevent indirect or creeping recognition implications,124 the minimal official foreign 
engagement with the actors based within the disputed territory stands out as exceptional 
and unparalleled when compared to most other frozen conflict settings. Therefore, what 
the internal Sahrawis sought in their struggle for recognition was to gain the ‘right’ to be 
treated and engaged in the same way as analogous groups of population. 
 
The earliest act of international recognition along these lines was the establishment in 
1991 of the MINURSO. This was a UN peacekeeping mission akin to those deployed in 
other conflicts around the world, whose headquarters were – significantly – located in 
Laayoune, inside the then-isolated Moroccan-annexed Western Sahara. The UN’s 
presence on the ground had an immediate impact on the identity formation and social 
status of internal Sahrawi nationalists as a new conflict actor, as it encouraged them for 
the first time to come out and express their grievances, especially about forced 
disappearances, after having stayed silent since the conflict’s outbreak in 1975. Indeed, 
this was true even during the exploratory phase that preceded MINURSO’s deployment 
as such. The first Sahrawi demonstration on record was convened on the occasion of a 
visit to Laayoune and Dakhla by a technical commission of the UN and the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) in 1987. This was an enormous novelty as, ‘during the 1980s, 
the Sahrawi population was unable to even imagine the possibility of a public 
demonstration’.125 Subsequently, the mere presence of the MINURSO in Laayoune would 
arouse new struggles for recognition. For example, the UN mission received denunciation 
letters from Sahrawi human rights abuse victims,126 even though it was not officially 
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mandated to have any contact with the local population or responsibility in human rights 
matters.127 
 
Twenty years later, the internal Sahrawi struggle for rights vis-à-vis the international 
community would concentrate on the disrespect entailed by the anomaly that the 
MINURSO mandate did not include human rights monitoring unlike all contemporary 
UN peacekeeping missions. Initiatives to redress this perceived international unfairness 
or ‘denial of rights’ became the core subject of discussion at the yearly UN Security 
Council debates on Western Sahara from 2009 onwards. They were temporarily 
supported by the Obama administration, and possibly reinforced by the universalistic 
‘Arab Spring’ framing of the Sahrawi Gdeim Izik protest of 2010.128 These developments 
made an indirect, transnational impact on Moroccan rights-based recognition policies 
towards the Sahrawis, as shown above. Just as importantly, they also precipitated a quite 
exceptional series of official UN trips to the disputed territory. November 2012 saw the 
– surprisingly – first ever visit by an UN Secretary-General’s personal envoy for Western 
Sahara to Western Sahara proper. Personal Envoy Christopher Ross’s interlocutors there 
included pro-Moroccan actors, local authorities and tribal sheikhs as well as internal pro-
independence activists. ‘I met Ross’ would become the proud leitmotif of my interviews 
with activists one year later,129 illustrating the value attached to this form of international 
recognition as ‘respect’. More technical OHCHR visits followed in 2014 and 2015. 
Subsequently, however, Morocco succeeded in refusing to allow Ross to return to 
Western Sahara. The visit of the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon announced in 
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2016130 was also eventually cancelled.131 In fact, Moroccan resistance and fear over the 
potential damage these visits could cause is testament to the extent to which recognition 
by the international community in the form of ‘respect’/equal rights was contributing to 
the constitution of internal Sahrawi pro-independence groups as an increasingly central 
conflict actor. 
 
5.5. Recognition as ‘esteem’/difference from the annexing state through institution-
building and co-optation 
 
In parallel to all these transnational recognition dynamics revolving around rights since 
the late 1990s, the Moroccan state also pursued a series of policies of recognition of 
difference, or recognition as ‘esteem’, with the aim of winning the hearts and minds of 
the broader Sahrawi population of the annexed Western Sahara territory. These policies 
differed from the half-hearted rights-based recognition measures discussed above in that 
they intentionally placed the emphasis on the particularity of Saharan/Sahrawi/Hassaniya 
identity. Yet, crucially, this was construed and promoted in exclusively cultural-
linguistic, folkloric and apolitical terms – with the additional effect of blurring the lines 
between ethnic Sahrawis from the south of Morocco proper and from Western Sahara. 
There was no room for any political recognition of Sahrawi national difference, for this 
would directly clash with the strictly one-nation conception of the Moroccan state. In 
Honneth’s terms, the limit to the reciprocal bonds of trust and solidarity that could be 
woven in such a way was the ‘political culture of nationalism’ and the prevalence of 
‘political integration along the lines of the nation-state’ as the primary sphere for the 
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formation of the ‘we’. Also, compared to the Western societies considered by Honneth, 
‘esteem’ in this context faced the essential hindrance posed by the absence of a 
democratic public sphere and process of will-formation.132 As regards causal 
mechanisms, the main pathway for this type of recognition was a combination of 
institution-building and co-optation of Sahrawi elite individuals. Most importantly, these 
measures did not respond to a distinct Sahrawi struggle and were therefore largely one-
sided Moroccan efforts devoid of mutuality. 
 
The Moroccan bet on ‘esteem’ came into being following the 1999 protests in Western 
Sahara, when the Rabat authorities announced a new era of ‘reconciliation’ with the 
Sahrawis, claiming to be turning the page of past repression. In the institutional domain, 
this translated into the establishment of a Royal Commission for the Monitoring of 
Saharan Affairs, tasked with hearing complaints about the recent crackdown on protests. 
The makeup of the commission sought to co-opt some pro-Moroccan Sahrawis, as it 
combined civilian and military appointees with local elected representatives. In parallel, 
and relatedly, various Moroccan and foreign actors were beginning to advocate for the 
idea of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as a so-called ‘third way’ to bring the 
Western Sahara conflict to a resolution.133 This also represented a recognition of 
difference, as political-administrative decentralisation and self-rule were not envisioned 
for all Moroccan regions across the board, but as an ad hoc solution for Western Sahara 
only. 
 
                                                          
132 Axel Honneth, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life (Cambridge: Polity, 
2014), p. 333. 
133 Fernández-Molina (2016) pp. 50-51. 
41 
 
The same mix of co-optive institutions, autonomy roadmap and ‘reconciliation’ discourse 
was upgraded in 2006-2007, in the aftermath the 2005 Sahrawi ‘intifada’. This saw the 
establishment of a Royal Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) and the 
drafting of a formal Autonomy Plan for the Western Sahara, which the king submitted to 
the UN secretary-general and Security Council. In the end, the 2006 Autonomy Plan 
offered a power-sharing arrangement that differed little from previous UN proposals (the 
Baker Plans I and II), albeit with the key change that any assumption of transitoriness was 
removed. Autonomy under Moroccan rule was meant to be the final status solution for 
the conflict, rather than an intermediate step towards Western Sahara’s long-promised 
self-determination referendum. Rather than its content, therefore, the Autonomy Plan’s 
main novelty lay in the ambitious public relations or ‘marketing’ campaign that 
surrounded it, both domestically and internationally.134 As regards the CORCAS, though 
set up as an ad hoc consultative body under King Mohammed VI’s direct authority, it was 
made up of appointed Sahrawi notables and members of parliament. It thus provided an 
avenue for selective elite participation and some illusion of mutuality in the recognition 
of Sahrawi difference.135  
 
The proof that this was far from satisfying the demands of internal Sahrawi nationalists 
was the stepping-up of their recognition struggle and pro-independence militancy, as 
evidenced by the creation of CODESA in 2007 and the ‘group of seven’s visit to Tindouf 
in 2009 (see above). Subsequent Moroccan partial measures of recognition of difference 
would include the 2011 Constitution’s novel yet vague references to the ‘Saharian-
Hassaniya component’ of Moroccan ‘unity’, and the preservation of Hassaniya language. 
The red line that has never been crossed and has remained a persistent source of 
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disrespect, however, concerns the persisting ban on party formation on an ethnic or 
regional basis. 
 
Conversely, from the side of the Polisario Front/SADR, recognition of the internal 
Sahrawi difference occupied a secondary place for the sake of the unity of the Sahrawi 
nation and nationalist movement. Although difference was acknowledged and 
institutionalised in the form of the SADR’s Ministry of the Occupied Territories and the 
Saharawi Community Abroad and the Polisario Front PGC’s Commission for the 
Occupied Territories, the emphasis was placed instead on recognition as ‘respect’/equal 
rights and ‘love’/empathy. Something similar occurred with the international community, 
whose discourse on the uniqueness of Sahrawis primarily referred to the refugees living 
in the Tindouf camps.136 
 
5.6. Recognition as ‘love’/empathy from the contested state and the international 
community through civil society and people-to-people contacts 
 
Although translatable to collective forms of affection, empathy and affiliation, the 
essence of recognition as ‘love’ requires close interpersonal relationships. According to 
the gradation of forms of recognition in Honneth’s theory, these actually precede and 
constitute an essential condition for struggles for ‘respect’/equal rights and 
‘esteem’/difference to arise. Similarly, on the transnational level, ‘it is the relational 
aspect of empathy and emotional engagement in cosmopolitan forms of recognition that 
are revealed as essential to the development and performance of other forms of 
recognition, both rights and solidarity’. 137 The causal mechanism enabling this ‘love’ for 
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the Sahrawis living under Moroccan rule has been civil society and people-to-people 
contacts outside the official sphere. While remaining scant with few exceptions from the 
side of the Moroccan significant other, these contacts have been prolific and instrumental 
for the internal Sahrawis’ emotional reconnection with refugees in the Tindouf camps, as 
well as for their nurturing and care by international civil society. In both cases, increased 
freedom of movement across the Moroccan-annexed Western Sahara’s borders acted as 
a vital facilitator of transnational ‘love’.138 
 
Non-official inter-Sahrawi contacts include those maintained by families and friends, 
along with human rights groups, trade unions, youth organisations and media. Family 
meetings were rare and difficult to arrange during the years of armed conflict and Western 
Sahara’s isolation. After the ceasefire, they were increasingly held abroad, especially in 
neighbouring Mauritania, and through refugees’ trips to the Moroccan-annexed territory 
with Mauritanian identity documents.139 Family visits also became part of the confidence-
building measures sponsored by the UN since the mid-2000s (though suspended in 2014). 
Still, the most powerful change and vehicle of ‘love’, since the turn of the millennium, 
was the rapid expansion of new technologies of information and communication on both 
sides of the berm. First, mobile phones became widespread, rendering futile the previous 
Moroccan restrictions on international calls from landlines – which were lifted in 2001 
anyway. Second, the internet burst on the scene as a result of the arrival of the first 
cybercafés in Laayoune.140 Access in Western Sahara’s private households also grew over 
the subsequent years, as did humble cybercafés in the Tindouf refugee camps. 
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Recognition as ‘love’ from the international community to the internal Sahrawi 
nationalists started to rise following the 2005 ‘intifada’. This turned thin cognitive 
recognition into an unparalleled flurry of Western journalists and ‘solidarity’ delegations 
trying to enter the Western Sahara territory – and often being expelled from Laayoune 
airport by the Moroccan authorities. Anyway, the subsequent easing of the Moroccan 
security grip on the territory facilitated visits and on-the-ground contacts between internal 
Sahrawi and foreign pro-Sahrawi civil society activists. Prominent internal Sahrawi 
leaders also began to get invited to participate in events abroad. Best placed in this regard 
were the CODESA founders, and especially Haidar, who in 2008 would receive the 
prestigious Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights Award.141 Her hunger strike in 2009 was a 
dramatic bodily struggle for recognition which forcefully raised her profile and her being 
cherished and cared for by international supporters. In a reciprocal manner, the latter’s 
emotional involvement reinforced the new centrality of internal Sahrawi pro-
independence groups as a conflict actor, facilitating international acknowledgement of 
their neediness and the recognition as ‘respect’/equal rights discussed above. 
 
6. Conclusions and broader research agenda 
 
This article has argued that frozen conflicts frequently change, and that recognition is a 
fundamental driving force in some of their bottom-up relational dynamics. This is 
particularly the case when a new conflict actor emerges altering the conflict’s inner 
player/party structure. Yet, most of the existing literature on recognition is ill-fitted to 
capture the workings of struggles for recognition and responses to them under frozen 
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conflict conditions, as a result of either having a purely domestic focus or neglecting non-
state actors. As shown here, in cases such as that of Western Sahara, recognition dynamics 
are inherently transnational. The concurrent processes and significant others involved, 
while located on different levels of analysis, causally impact on one another transcending 
the domestic-international divide. The article has aimed to advance middle-range 
theorising on frozen conflicts and debates on recognition in IR. It has sought to make a 
contribution by: developing the nascent concept of transnational recognition in a novel 
application to (frozen) conflict contexts; unpacking this type of transnational recognition 
into its constitutive causal mechanisms on the side of both emerging conflict actors and 
their significant others; confronting the methodological challenge142 of empirically 
operationalising recognition theory and Honneth’s tripartite division of forms of 
recognition in a non-normative manner, adding a fourth merely cognitive layer and 
making some transnational corrections; building a typology of causal mechanisms 
whereby transnational relations of recognition constitute conflict actors in frozen 
conflicts; and demonstrating the dual effects of recognition in such conditions. 
 
In the case of Western Sahara, the new actor that has vividly arisen and has reshaped the 
conflict from the bottom up by struggling for recognition are internal Sahrawi pro-
independence groups based within the territory annexed by Morocco. Their coming to the 
fore has been by no means inevitable, or a necessary consequence of a monolithic Sahrawi 
national identity understood in an essentialist manner, but rather the product of complex, 
contingent and ever-moving transnational social interactions. Three significant others and 
six causal mechanisms of transnational forms of recognition have been identified as 
playing some role in the constitution of this actor. Media coverage provided internal 
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Sahrawi groups with thin cognitive recognition from the Moroccan state and the 
international community. At the same time, Morocco’s international socialisation, the 
Polisario Front/SADR’s competitive recognition, and the international community’s 
official engagement on the ground have instituted different and often conflicting forms 
of recognition as ‘respect’, or equal rights. The prevalence of instrumental rationality and 
the absence of mutuality have led some of these – especially Morocco’s – to result in 
further disrespect and (re)generate internal Sahrawi struggles. The Moroccan state has 
simultaneously pursued recognition as ‘esteem’, or difference, by means of institution-
building and co-optation strategies. Meanwhile, Sahrawi and international civil society 
have multiplied more reciprocal efforts with recognition as ‘love’ and empathy through 
people-to-people contacts. Most importantly, most of these processes have been mutually 
dependent. International cognitive and rights-based recognition have been a key factor 
stimulating Moroccan and Polisario Front/SADR rights-based recognition policies, 
through the mechanisms of international socialisation and competitive recognition 
respectively. On a different level, Moroccan recognition of difference has been countered 
by inter-Sahrawi and international recognition as ‘love’. 
 
The effect of such intermingling of recognition processes has been the identity formation 
and social status building of internal Sahrawi groups as an increasingly distinct and 
central conflict actor, shifting from victims to human rights activists, and then to activists 
involved in an unsolved conflict. Consequently, overall, in Honneth’s alternative between 
mutuality and further struggle, outcomes have tilted towards the latter. This may have 
emancipatory potential from a Sahrawi nationalist perspective, but is far from the 
‘recognitional peace’ expected by the peacebuilding literature on recognition. Instead, it 
supports the argument that real-world recognition dynamics produce dual and contingent 
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effects. Due to the multiple, cross-cutting identities that exist in the socio-political world, 
‘processes of recognition are fractious and unstable, characterised by aggression and self-
assertion, as well as affection and the creation of a “we-feeling”’.143 In particular, partial 
and one-sided recognition initiatives driven by instrumental rationality and far removed 
from the ideal of mutuality tend to widen self vs. other differences,144 increasing feelings 
of disrespect and triggering new struggles. Conflict contexts involving competition 
between various significant others tend to stimulate these normatively flawed recognition 
dynamics, resulting in further conflict complexity. 
 
One final question concerns the extent to which the typology constructed here may be 
generalisable and applicable to other frozen conflicts. By definition, causal mechanism 
are not parsimonious universal laws, but rather operate only under certain contextual 
conditions. Some of the transnational recognition struggles and mechanisms observed in 
the Western Sahara conflict are likely to be similarly operative in other frozen conflicts, 
where the absence of large-scale violence allows for a relative institutional stability and 
thus likewise constituted avenues for non-coercive change.145 Disentangling their 
functioning through further single-case or comparative studies based on this typology 
would thus help make sense of how important frozen conflict dynamics are shaped by 
experiences of disrespect and recognition relations between various selfs and others – 
non-state actors, parent state, patron state, regional and international actors. Examples 
include the processes of national identity formation and nation-building associated with 
the emergence (e.g. secession) of contested states (e.g. that of Transnistria in 1989-1990, 
driven by misrecognition of difference by Moldavian elites); subsequent contested state 
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identity shifts (e.g. those of Northern Cyprus in 2003, associated with a growing 
engagement with the EU, or the post-2003 Iraqi Kurdistan, shaped by US sponsorship 
and the massive inflow of Western aid agencies); internal non-state intergroup dynamics 
in ethnically heterogeneous contested states (e.g. Abkhazia, Transnistria); and social 
movements and protests in frozen conflicts, either circumscribed within a contested state 
(e.g. the ‘Abkhazian revolution’ which overthrew the president in 2014) or arising in the 
wider conflict setting and transcending national/ethnic boundaries (e.g. the ‘Bosnian 
spring’ of 2014, which involved both Bosniaks and Croats). 
 
A closer case to the one addressed here, starred by a non-state actor from a contested 
state, is that of Turkish-Cypriot civil society and the transnational recognition relations 
that have aided its growing profile and influence. Being almost solely concerned with the 
Cyprus dispute, these civil society groups may rightly be viewed as a non-state conflict 
actor, or a set thereof. Since the 1980s, they have operated not only within the context of 
an internationally isolated, non-recognised contested state such as the Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), but also in a largely oppositional relationship to the elites 
dominating the latter’s government. This has led to various forms of domestic 
misrecognition, including the absence of a legal framework (rights) for civil society 
activity. While a minority ‘hard-line’ camp has upheld relations with the patron state 
(Turkey), mainstream ‘moderate’ Turkish-Cypriot civil society organisations have 
struggled for and received substantial recognition from two other significant others: their 
Greek-Cypriots counterparts in the parent state (Republic of Cyprus) – through 
bicommunal people-to-people reconciliation initiatives – and the international 
community (the UN and most notably the EU). EU recognition has taken the form of 
institutional on-the-ground engagement as well as post-2004 project-based financial 
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assistance and technical capacity-building. By engaging with this civil society as an 
alternative non-state avenue to make up for the absence of bilateral relations with the 
TRNC administration – for fear of creeping recognition – the EU has contributed to 
turning it into a relevant actor, altering the Turkish-Cypriot domestic power balance and 
also encouraging inter-Cypriot people-to-people contacts.146 
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